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Abstract This article discusses environmental policy integration—a concept so far
mainly applied to domestic and European politics—at the global level. The article dis-
tinguishes between integration of institutions, of organizations, and of their bureaucracies,
and it addresses both internal integration (within the environmental policy domain) and
external integration (between environmental policies and non-environmental policies). The
overall focus is on one set of policy reform proposals that have been salient in the global
environmental governance debate for the last decades: the question of whether the creation
of a world environment organization would improve the effectiveness, legitimacy, and
efficiency of global environmental governance. We revisit this debate and explore the
options for organizational change, including clustering, upgrading, streamlining, and
hierarchical steering, with a focus on whether the reform proposals can bring about
environmental policy integration. We conclude that in the longer term, upgrading of the
UN Environment Programme to a UN specialized agency, with additional and increasing
streamlining of other institutions and bureaucracies, offers the most potential for envi-
ronmental policy integration and does not appear to be unrealistic.
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1 Introduction
It is a frequent argument in writings on global environmental governance that the insti-
tutions and organizations active in this field are not living up to the challenges (overview in
Elliott 2005; Biermann and Pattberg 2008; Kanie and Haas 2004). This finding—even
though not shared by all observers—has led to a policy debate on the reform of the entire
architecture1 of institutions and organizations. In 1972, governments created the United
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) as catalyst and coordinator of environmental
policy in the United Nations (UN) system, and—even though the term was then not used—
as a protagonist of environmental policy integration. However, today many argue that
UNEP is not equipped to adequately deal with pressing environmental problems, partially
because its status of a programme brings limitations in the area of funding, staffing, status,
and mandate (Biermann 2005; Ivanova 2007a, 44; Bauer 2009). In addition, there is
widespread dissatisfaction with the current fragmentation of global environmental gover-
nance and the lack of coordination that leads to gaps, overlaps, and inconsistencies among
organizations and programmes (Andresen 2007, 330). There are hundreds of treaties and
agencies operating with little formal linkages with each other. Norms and standards are
created independently, and most specialized agencies and bodies have initiated their own
environmental programmes independently from each other and with little effective policy
coordination among themselves or with UNEP.
In response to this perceived failure of global environmental governance, several voices
have called for the establishment of a new strong agency that would replace, or upgrade,
UNEP (see Bauer and Biermann 2005; Biermann and Bauer 2005 on details of the reform
debate). Such proposals come under a variety of titles that sometimes—yet not always—
reflect different priorities or functions that such a new agency could have, such as World
Environment Organization, United Nations Environment Organization, Global Environment
Organization, World Organization for Environment and Development, World Organization
on Sustainable Development or United Nations Organization for Environmental Protection.
One argument for a radically different approach is that it may enhance the potential for
environmental policy integration within the environmental policy domain as well as in other
policy areas. Yet other scholars prefer to stay closer to the current system and to reform it in a
way that strengthens environmental policy without creating a new agency that may be costly
in both financial and political terms (Oberthu¨r and Gehring 2005).
This article revisits the debate on the architecture of global environmental governance
and links it to discussions about environmental policy integration. It aims to bring the
debate further by examining several organizational and institutional options in relation to
their potential to achieve environmental policy integration, and is in this respect
complementary to the article of Oberthu¨r (2009) in this issue.
1 See Biermann et al. (2009a) on a conceptualization of ‘‘global governance architectures’’.
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The structure of the article is as follows. Section 2 elaborates how the concept of
environmental policy integration can be applied to global environmental governance.
Section 3 revisits and summarizes the debate on the architecture of global environmental
governance. The main Sect. 4 then explores the options for organizational and institutional
change, including clustering, upgrading, streamlining, and hierarchical steering, and
examines the different options in relation to their potential for environmental policy
integration. Section 5 concludes.
2 Conceptualizing environmental policy integration at the global level
Environmental policy integration became a leading concept in global environmental
governance with the publication of the Brundtland report in 1987 (World Commission on
Environment and Development 1987; see also Nilsson et al. 2009), drawing on comparable
discourses in national policy making (Nilsson 2005; Hertin and Berkhout 2003; Lafferty
and Hovden 2003; Nilsson and Eckerberg 2007). The Brundtland report defined sustainable
development as including environmental, economic, and social dimensions. Importantly, it
has been argued that the critical importance of the concept of sustainable development is
that it is an integrationist principle (McGoldrick 1996, 818). In the words of the interna-
tional lawyer Fitzmaurice (2001, 47), ‘‘Very broadly, sustainable development can be
defined as a concept, which attempts to integrate environmental considerations into eco-
nomic and other development and which takes into account other than environmental needs
while formulating the principles of environmental protection’’.
The integration of environmental protection was formally recognized as a principle of
international law in 1992, when the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development
gave it a legal status.2 More precisely, Principle 4 of the Declaration states that ‘‘[i]n order
to achieve sustainable development, environmental protection shall constitute an integral
part of the development process and cannot be considered in isolation from it’’. The
International Law Association has taken the development of the integration principle
further.3 In its New Delhi Declaration of Principles of International Law relating to Sus-
tainable Development, the principle is incorporated as the principle of integration and
interrelationship. The Declaration states in paragraphs 7.1–7.3 that the ‘‘principle of
integration reflects the interdependence of social, economic, financial, environmental, and
human rights aspects of principles and rules of international law relating to sustainable
development as well as of the interdependence of the needs of current and future gener-
ations of humankind’’ and that ‘‘All levels of governance—global, regional, national,
subnational, and local—and all sectors of society should implement the integration prin-
ciple, which is essential to the achievement of sustainable development’’. In addition,
‘‘states should strive to resolve apparent conflicts between competing economic, financial,
social, and environmental considerations, whether through existing institutions or through
the establishment of appropriate new institutions’’.
2 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I).
3 Resolution 3/2002 of the International Law Association: The New Delhi Declaration of Principles of
International Law Relating to Sustainable Development, published in UN Doc A/57/329. The ILA New
Delhi Declaration includes a focus on: (1) Duty to ensure sustainable use of natural resources, (2) Equity and
the eradication of poverty, (3) Common but differentiated responsibilities, (4) Precautionary approach to
human health, natural resources, and ecosystems, (5) Public participation and access to information and
justice, (6) Good governance, and (7) Integration and interrelationship, in particular in relation to human
rights and social, economic, and environmental objectives.
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In order to make this principle operational at the policy level, the EPIGOV project
defines environmental policy integration in a restricted sense, namely, as the integration of
environmental concerns into other policy areas (Von Homeyer et al. 2009; Nilsson et al.
2009). Such areas may include, for example, economic and social development, agricul-
ture, trade, energy, infrastructure, and transport. Hence, the EPIGOV definition focuses on
external policy integration, denoting integration beyond the environmental policy domain
and excluding internal integration within the environmental policy domain. Yet this
approach, while sensible at the national and European level, meets problems at the global
level, where institutional and organizational fragmentation within the environmental
domain is seen as one of the main problems. Thus, our subsequent analysis will also need
to include this dimension of internal integration.
Consequently, we propose to organize research, appraisal, and policy reform debates on
environmental policy integration at the global level around four analytical questions, which
follow from a focus on two different dimensions of the debate: institutional and organi-
zational integration, and internal and external integration. This is also the basic structure of
the present analysis.
(1) Institutions, Organizations, and Bureaucracies. First, it is important to distinguish
between the organizational and the institutional dimensions of governance. Institutions are
systems of norms, rules, and decision-making procedures that give rise to social practices,
that assign roles to participants in these practices, and that guide interactions among
participants (IHDP 1999; Young et al. 2008; also Simmons and Martin 2002, 192–4).
Organizations, on the other hand, are commonly defined as actors that have physical
qualities, such as staff, headquarters, resources, and formalized leadership, and that
effectively pursue a policy. The concept of organizations can apply to all kinds of entities,
scales, and objectives and may range from public to private and from global to local. In this
article, we focus on intergovernmental organizations that have been set up by governments
to pursue a public policy.
Furthermore, the broader notion of intergovernmental organizations needs to be dis-
tinguished from the bureaucracy that stands at the center of the organization. We define
intergovernmental organizations as the complex of three elements: (a) a normative
framework of principles and rules governing the organization; (b) state members of the
organizations; and (c) a bureaucracy and its leader at the center of the organization (see
Biermann et al. 2009b in more detail on this distinction). Thus, it is important in the reform
debate to distinguish between intergovernmental institutions (often also known as
‘‘regimes’’),4 intergovernmental organizations, and intergovernmental bureaucracies. To
give one illustration: the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships (MARPOL) is an effective framework of principles, norms, rules, and decision-
making procedures around this issue area. The International Maritime Organization (IMO)
is, as an organization, the collective actor of the IMO member states to support the
MARPOL convention, for example through agreement on more specific rules and imple-
mentation standards. The IMO Secretariat is then the intergovernmental bureaucracy that is
mandated to serve the parties of both IMO and MARPOL in their activities, to prepare new
4 The term ‘‘international regimes’’ more specifically denotes—in Krasner’s (1983, 2) standard definition—
‘‘sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’
expectations converge in a given area of international relations’’. However, in order to stay within the
general terminology of the social sciences, we use in this article, throughout, the term international insti-
tutions rather than regimes.
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policies, and to help implementing the intergovernmental institutional framework (see
Campe 2009 for a case study on the IMO secretariat based on this framework).
The influence of intergovernmental organizations and their bureaucracies in world
politics has been at the center of an extensive debate in recent years. Different organiza-
tions and bureaucracies have been shown to have different degrees of influence, and the
influence varies in different functional areas. In line with recent research (Biermann and
Siebenhu¨ner 2009), we propose to distinguish three dimensions of the influence of inter-
governmental bureaucracies: cognitive, normative, and executive influence.
The cognitive influence denotes the role that intergovernmental bureaucracies play in
fostering the informational basis of (environmental) policy making, for example through
the initiation, generation, synthesis, and dissemination of scientific knowledge on envi-
ronmental problems, through the provision of institutional knowledge to negotiators, or
through the raising of awareness and the advancement of specific (pro-environmental)
discourses in national and international debates. The normative influence refers to the role
that (some) intergovernmental bureaucracies play in fostering the progressive development
of international and national norms, for example through the initiation of intergovern-
mental norm-setting processes, the proactive support of on-going negotiations, or the
support and guidance of national and subnational norm setting. The executive influence
denotes the important role that many international bureaucracies have in supporting policy
making and policy implementation on the ground, for example through funding, designing,
supporting or implementing (environmental) projects in certain countries. Recent research
on the influence of intergovernmental environmental bureaucracies has shown that many
bureaucracies have some autonomous influence on all of these three dimensions, with some
bureaucracies even having had decisive influence in certain phases of the policy cycle (see
the case studies in Biermann and Siebenhu¨ner 2009).
(2) External and Internal Integration. Second, one needs to distinguish whether envi-
ronmental policy integration is sought within the environmental realm (internal integra-
tion) or between environmental policy and other policy domains (external integration).
Naturally, boundaries are blurred, and some policies may be seen as having environmental
as well as non-environmental elements. The protection of the global climate through
reducing emissions of greenhouse gases, for example, can be seen as an objective of
environmental policy (probably the most common frame in the North), but also as a core
issue of economic development policy (a frame often advanced in the South). Other
examples are the Rotterdam and Stockholm conventions on hazardous substances that aim
at integrating both environmental and health concerns into industrial and agricultural
policies.
Systematizing the debate on a new UN agency on environmental issues according to
these two basic differentiations, we arrive at the following matrix of analytical questions
(see Table 1).
Analyzing the recent proposals for a new UN agency in and around the field of envi-
ronmental policy, it is thus important to specify what kind of question the proposal
addresses. In many cases, most proposals implicitly address more than one of the aspects
outlined above.
3 Taking stock: revisiting the debate on global environmental governance
The debate on strengthening global environmental governance and the possible role of a
new intergovernmental agency in this field dates back more than three decades. Bauer and
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Biermann (2005) offer a review of the literature, in which they distinguish three peaks in
the debate: An initial phase in the early 1970s, around the 1972 UN Conference on the
Human Environment; a second peak in the mid-1990s, following the 1992 UN Conference
on Environment and Development; and a third peak in the context of the 2002 World
Summit on Sustainable Development. The French initiative for a new agency from 2007,
centered on the Paris Call for Action of February 3 2007, has triggered what one could
describe as a fourth peak, followed by new initiatives such as Brazil’s proposal for a
combined organization for environment and development. This section summarizes these
four peaks of proposals on a new intergovernmental environmental organization, with an
emphasis on the most recent developments.
The first proposals to create a global organization for environmental politics date back
to the early 1970s and resulted in the creation of the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP), following a decision adopted at the 1972 Stockholm Conference on
the Human Environment (United Nations General Assembly 1972). UNEP was set up as a
subsidiary body of the UN General Assembly, reporting through the UN Economic and
Social Council. Originally, governments wanted UNEP to evolve into an ‘‘environmental
conscience’’ within the UN system that would act as a catalyst triggering environmental
projects in other bodies and help to coordinate UN environmental policies. In practice,
however, UNEP has not fully met its promise and has been forced to lower its ambitions
over time. Recently, it has even been characterized as weak, underfunded, overloaded, and
remote (Haas 2005, 49; more positive is Bauer 2009).
The debate about a larger, more powerful agency for global environmental policy was
revived in 1989. The Declaration of The Hague, initiated by the Netherlands, France, and
Norway, called for an authoritative international body on the atmosphere.5 Yet at the 1992
UN Conference on Environment and Development, the main reform outcome was the
creation of the UN Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), a consultative organ
of the UN Economic and Social Council with limited representation that mainly serves as
forum for deliberation and debate (for example Dodds et al. 2002).
This situation triggered a second round of proposals for organized intergovernmental
environmental regulation (for example Charnovitz 1993, 2005; Esty 1994; Runge 1994).
The revival of the debate was especially fuelled by continuing doubts regarding the
effectiveness of UNEP and limited competences of the (then new) UN Commission on
Sustainable Development. A 1997 report by an UN office heaped heavy criticism on the
Table 1 Analytical questions
Institutional reform Organizational reform
Internal
policy
integration
Will a new agency improve the integration
of different intergovernmental
environmental institutions?
Will a new agency improve the cognitive,
normative, and executive influence of the
UN system by better integrating existing
actors with an environmental mandate?
External
policy
integration
Will a new agency improve the integration
of intergovernmental environmental
institutions with non-environmental
institutions?
Will a new agency improve the cognitive,
normative, and executive influence of the
UN system by better integrating
environmental actors and non-environmental
actors?
5 Declaration of The Hague, March 11, 1989, concerning the earth’s atmosphere and possible approaches to
preserve its quality.
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management and the overall performance of UNEP (United Nations Office of Internal
Oversight Services 1997). The report argued that UNEP lacked a clear role and that it was
not clear to staff or stakeholders what that role should be. At the 1997 Special Session of
the UN General Assembly on environment and development, Brazil, Germany, Singapore,
and South Africa submitted a joint proposal for a world environment organization to
replace UNEP.6 In reaction, Secretary General Kofi Annan called on the UN General
Assembly to set up a task force, led by then UNEP Executive Director Klaus To¨pfer, to
assess the environmental activities of the UN (United Nations Secretary-General 1998).
Following the report of this task force, an Environmental Management Group was created
within the UN system, and it was decided that the UNEP Governing Council should meet
regularly at ministerial level.
These initiatives stimulated further academic input in the discourse, amounting to a
third peak in attention around the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development. The
broadening of the debate resulted in a variety of new views about what a world envi-
ronment organization should or should not do. Biermann (2000, 2001, 2002) developed
detailed proposals that outlined a possible upgrade of UNEP to a World Environment
Organization. Bharat Desai (2000) examined prospects for a UN Environment Protection
Organization that would report to a newly mandated UN Trusteeship Council. Tarasofsky
(2002) discussed how UNEP and its Global Ministerial Environment Forum could be
substantially strengthened without changing the programme’s legal status or name. Haas
(2004) argued for a Global Environmental Organization that would mainly serve to cen-
tralize the collection and dissemination of environmental expertise. Kimball (2002) dis-
cussed the international institutional conditions under which UNEP might be transformed
into a global environmental organization. Others added an economic perspective to a
debate that had thus far been sustained by diplomats, international lawyers, and political
scientists (Whalley and Zissimos 2002). From the political community, for instance
Gustave Speth, former head of UNDP, also supported the creation of a new environmental
organization (Speth 2004). Klaus To¨pfer, when still executive director of UNEP, empha-
sized the nexus of developmental and environmental concerns and was thus reluctant to
call for a specialized agency that would focus exclusively on the environment. Instead,
To¨pfer appeared to support the creation of a strong World Organization on Sustainable
Development.7
Most recently, the debate has been given new impetus by the diplomatic effort of France
to create a UN Environment Organization.8 In 2003, the French government circulated a
proposal to transform UNEP into an ‘‘Organisation spe´cialise´e des Nations Unies pour
l’environnement’’, which follows up on earlier French initiatives to replace UNEP by an
‘‘Organisation mondiale de l’environnement’’ or an ‘‘impartial and indisputable global
center for the evaluation of our environment’’.9 This proposal has been emphasized by the
2007 Paris Call for Action during the Citizens of the Earth Conference for Global
6 UN document A/S-19/23, June 24, 1997.
7 See for instance To¨pfer’s presentation in the Global Governance Speakers Series on February 28, 2003,
Berlin, Germany [on file with authors].
8 Proposition fran1aise de transformer le Programme des Nations Unies pour l’environnement en une
Organisation spe´cialise´e des Nations Unies pour l’environnement, Septembre 12, 2003 [on file with
authors].
9 See the speech by the French minister for ecology and sustainable development, Roselyne Bachelot-
Narquin, who reaffirmed the commitment of the French government to strive for the creation of a UNEO
together with like-minded countries (Bachelot-Narquin 2004).
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Ecological Governance.10 The Call for Action pleas for the adoption of a Universal
Declaration of Environmental Rights and Duties, which would ensure a new human right to
a sound and well-preserved environment. The aim to transform UNEP into a UN Envi-
ronment Organization remains a strong focal point, highlighted by the establishment of a
Group of Friends of the UN Environment Organization. Subsequently, the group has met in
Morocco for in-depth discussions on mandates and institutional aspects involved in the
establishment of such an organization.
The French initiative has been supported by a consultative process within the UN
system itself. In 2005, the Permanent Representatives of Mexico and Switzerland were
assigned as co-chairs to the Informal Consultative Process on the Institutional Framework
for the United Nations’ Environmental Activities (Berruga and Maurer 2007). This process
aimed at exploring the possibility of a more coherent institutional framework to address the
need for more efficient environmental activities in the UN system.11 After a series of
consultations with country delegations, members of the UN Secretariat and secretariats of
multilateral environmental agreements, as well as with scientists, business leaders, and
non-governmental organizations, the co-chairs presented several proposals on how to
address the shortcomings in international environmental governance (Co-Chairs Options
Paper 2007). Among these proposals was the establishment of a UN Environment
Organization. In a first reaction to this Co-Chairs Options Paper, the European Union
collectively supported the formation of a UN Environment Organization.12
Developing country positions varied in this debate. Developing countries initially feared
that environmental governance could be a threat to economic development (Persson 2009).
The influential Founex Report of 1971, for example, argued that the environmental
problems of developing countries are ‘‘predominantly problems that reflect the poverty and
very lack of development of their societies. […] It is evident that, in large measure, the
kind of environmental problems that are of importance in developing countries are those
that can be overcome by the process of development itself. […] In [the context of
developing countries], development becomes essentially a cure for their major environ-
mental problems’’ (Founex Report 1971, 4).
Among other things, the location of UNEP headquarters in Nairobi has greatly increased
the support from developing countries (Najam 2005a, 309). Yet choosing this location for
UNEP’s headquarters has also been mentioned by some observers as a source of the
problems facing UNEP, because it contributes to the fragmentation of environmental
governance and makes it difficult for UNEP to attract and hold on to qualified staff
(Hierlmeier 2002, 786). Importantly, however, the position of developing countries
gradually evolved from opposition to participation and then to active engagement in dis-
cussions about environmental governance, which is demonstrated by their increased
involvement in proposals for reform (Najam 2005a).
In sum, the debate on the architecture of global environmental governance has been
through different stages in the past 30 years. An important part of the discourse has
remained the question of the advantages or disadvantages of a new specialized UN agency
on environmental protection. Numerous proposals for such an organization have been
made (summarized in Table 2), some of which continue to resurface during different
10 Paris Call for Action, February 2, 2007. Available at: http://www.ecologie.gouv.fr/conference/
?PARIS-CALL-FOR-ACTION.
11 UN document A/RES/60/1, October 24, 2005.
12 See EU’s first reaction on the co-chair’s Options Paper: Informal consultative process on the institutional
framework for the UN environmental activities, 2007.
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phases of the debate. Some formerly opposing voices in the academic debate have come
around and now support a robust environmental pillar within the global governance system
(e.g., Najam et al. 2007, which differs from Najam 2005b).
4 Organizational options and their potential for environmental policy integration
This section provides the first assessment of the potential for improved environmental
policy integration brought about by the different reform proposals that have been advanced
by governments, policy advisors, and scholars. We organize these proposals according to
the classification first introduced in Biermann (2000), that is, we distinguish between
proposals (a) that seek to merely upgrade UNEP to a new agency and to give it a stronger
role in policy coordination and implementation; (b) proposals that seek, in addition, to
integrate different organizations and institutions into a new agency (‘‘streamlining’’); and
(c) proposals that seek to provide the new agency with enforcement powers that effectively
limit the sovereignty of governments (‘‘hierarchization’’). Many observers have rejected
the calls for the creation of a new agency, but have instead proposed other means of
advancing the integration of environmental policies. These proposals—which usually
target the ‘‘clustering’’ of existing institutions and organizations—we include in the
following as well, as the least far-reaching reform strategy.
4.1 Clustering existing institutions, organizations, and bureaucracies
One stream of reform proposals rejects creating a new agency, but rather calls for clus-
tering multilateral environmental agreements on a thematic or functional basis. This
clustering approach is based on the assumption that the current number of international
environmental institutions is too large to possibly be efficient or effective and that merging
institutions and organizations (the streamlining approach discussed below) would be a
troublesome task that is hardly feasible for a number of reasons (see von Moltke 2005).
Instead, proposals to cluster seek to promote efficiency and effectiveness by grouping a
number of institutions together without formally integrating them. The idea arose from a
process of negotiations within UNEP, following Decision 21/21 of the UNEP Governing
Council, aiming at reform and strengthening of international environmental management
(von Moltke 2005).
In addition, the rationale for clustering is rooted in the perception that the goal of
strengthening environmental governance will not be attained by the establishment of a new
environmental organization in the first place. In this view, one single institution cannot
adequately address the environment, as it encompasses too many different issues all with
their own distinct problem structures. Instead, clustering of institutions and bureaucracies
would increase the efficiency and effectiveness of existing agreements without requiring
elaborate changes in legal or administrative arrangements (von Moltke 2005). Such
measures could include grouping the functions of related convention secretariats together,
streamlining activities and meetings, coordinating operations and budgeting, or improving
transparency and participation to minimize institutional overlap and fragmentation (Iva-
nova 2007b).
Both from an organizational and from an institutional perspective, clustering requires
the least change in comparison with the current system. With regard to organizational
alterations, it would entail merely sharing functions of convention secretariats in order to
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synchronize activities. Institutional measures would be minimal too, limited for instance to
the formation of a Memorandum of Understanding.
The potential for effective environmental policy integration is, therefore, rather small.
First, clustering is—at least in the current proposals—restricted to internal integration
within environmental policy. External integration—such as between economic and envi-
ronmental institutions or organizations—has not been at the center of the clustering dis-
course. Second, clustering meets problems since clusters could be organized according to
different principles, such as environmental medium (e.g., atmosphere), institutional
functions (e.g., trade restriction), or source of pollution (e.g., long-range air pollution).
Different clusters according to different mediums, functions, and sources of pollution
would need to be created, possibly increasing fragmentation and inefficiencies instead of
preventing them (see Biermann 2005, 137–139 in more detail). Third, since clustering will
provide only for rather weak linkages between institutions and bureaucracies, a strong
coordinating actor would still be needed.
In other words, a main task of coordinating and catalyzing these clustering processes
would remain with UNEP. Indeed, in 1999, UN General Assembly Resolution 53/242
reaffirmed UNEP’s role as the leading global environmental authority that sets the global
environmental agenda and promotes the integration of the environmental aspects of sus-
tainable development into the work of the UN system.13 However, practice has shown that,
in its current state, UNEP is relatively powerless to influence environmental policy inte-
gration. It merely encourages decision makers in government, industry, and business to
develop and adopt environmentally sound policies, strategies, practices, and technologies.
Furthermore, UNEP lacks the authority to execute projects on the ground and cannot avail
itself of any regular and predictable funding (Bauer 2009). This gives the programme little
power and authority vis-a`-vis the independent environmental agreements, their secretariats,
or other organizations.
Clustering alone thus does not show much potential for improving environmental policy
integration. Mere clustering cannot advance environmental policy integration by taking on
leadership, as it does not entail the establishment of any body capable of executing such
leadership. The policy process itself, including agenda setting, planning, execution, and
evaluation, is hardly affected by clustering. Even though advocates of clustering claim it
holds the promise of increasing the efficiency of the use of available resources, it is highly
unlikely that this option would free significant budgetary resources in order to finance
environmental policy integration (Oberthu¨r 2002). Overall, the potential for improvement
of external environmental policy integration by means of clustering is limited, since the
scope of clustering only addresses multilateral environmental agreements.
4.2 Upgrading UNEP to a specialized agency
A second group of proposals focuses on upgrading UNEP to a specialized UN agency with
full-fledged organizational status. Proponents of this approach have referred to the World
Health Organization or the International Labour Organization as suitable models.
According to this approach, other institutions and organizations operating in the envi-
ronmental field would neither be integrated into the new agency nor otherwise disbanded.
The new agency in this model is expected to improve the facilitation and coordination of
norm-building and norm-implementation processes in comparison to UNEP. This strength
13 UN document A/RES/53/242, August 10, 1999.
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would in particular derive from an enhanced mandate and better capabilities of the agency
to build capacities in developing countries. This differs from UNEP’s present ‘‘catalytic’’
mandate that prevents the programme from engaging in project implementation in the field.
Furthermore, additional legal and political powers that could come with the status of a UN
specialized agency could enable such a world environment organization to approve by
qualified majority vote certain regulations. Its governing body could be a general assembly
that could adopt drafts of legally binding treaties that have been negotiated by subcom-
mittees under its auspices. Such powers could exceed those entrusted to the UNEP
Governing Council, which has supported intergovernmental negotiations on a number of
issues, but cannot adopt legal instruments by itself.
Upgrading UNEP to a specialized UN agency may thus have more potential for
improving internal environmental policy integration. Merely upgrading UNEP to a
specialized agency would not formally affect other institutions, organizations, and their
bureaucracies, all of which would remain, in this model, independent. Yet it is likely that a
stronger bureaucracy with an exclusively environmental mandate would better be able to
support public discourses and policy making through scientific and other types of infor-
mation and through the generation, neutral assessment, and wide dissemination of envi-
ronmental knowledge. It could also be in a better position to stimulate new norm
development, including through the formal initiation of new environmental treaties similar
to the norm-building process of the International Labour Organization. Such a specialized
agency would also be better equipped to take on a leading role in influencing environ-
mental policy integration. Besides improved leadership capacities, various phases of the
policy process could be influenced by the new organizational status. Elevated status would
mean having more influence in agenda setting and the ability to plan and execute combined
programmes, rather than depending on others. Organizational status would imply a fixed
budget, which offers new prospects for planning. New agreements developed under the
organization would most likely have a closer link to it, and the new treaty secretariats could
be integrated from the start in the new organization, increasing the overall integration of
intergovernmental environmental bureaucracies within one organization.
Concerning external environmental policy integration, a new UN specialized agency
under this model would have formally no different relationship to non-environmental
institutions and organizations than the current UNEP. Yet it is likely that with increased
mandate and possibly with larger resources and staff, the new body would also be able to
better influence non-environmental policy processes, thus fostering external environmental
policy integration.
4.3 Streamlining institutions, organizations, and bureaucracies
A third group of proposals seeks to go further and advocates a more centralized or
streamlined architecture. These authors make their case by challenging the substantive
functional overlap between the multitude of institutions and organizations that have a say
in international environmental policy. Consequently, streamlining advocates call for an
approach that would integrate existing institutions, organizations, and their bureaucracies
into one all-encompassing world environment organization. They argue that prospective
gains in efficiency and better coordination of international environmental policy could
outweigh the risks that often accompany streamlining. The integration of environmental
institutions could loosely follow the model of the World Trade Organization, which has
integrated diverse multilateral trade agreements under one umbrella. According to some
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scholars,14 this integrative effort could even include established intergovernmental orga-
nizations although historic evidence suggests that this might go far beyond the politically
feasible.
Streamlining would entail more than moderate organizational consequences, as it sig-
nifies administrative, legal, and political integration of existing institutions, organizations,
and their bureaucracies. Realizing such extensive integration would entail having to make
major institutional alterations to the current system. Such alterations would include
providing the new organization with the authority to formulate rules and implement them.
However, streamlining does not include the authority to enforce these rules upon nations.
Streamlining has potential for internal environmental policy integration. First, inter-
national institutions could be integrated in the same way in which the many multilateral
and plurilateral trade agreements function today under the overall institutional umbrella of
the World Trade Organization. Normative, functional, or political conflicts between dif-
ferent multilateral environmental agreements could be reduced through a general legal and
institutional framework. Many functions that lie today with separate institutions—such as
reporting, financing, awareness raising, or dispute settlement—could be integrated in
centralized mechanisms under the overarching new UN environmental agency. In this
model, a new agency would also integrate a number of so far (largely) independent
environmental bureaucracies, notably the many treaty secretariats. This would generate
substantial efficiencies in administration, but more so increase synergies in the support
functions of these smaller bureaucracies, all of which could better rely on expertise and
experience of similar bureaucracies in other fields.
Regarding external environmental policy integration, a larger and stronger environment
organization would be better able to provide headship in advancing environmental policy
integration in other policy fields. It would be a more equal partner of the other major
organizations and their bureaucracies. Centralizing environmental bureaucracies and
institutions would also simplify planning processes within the environmental policy
domain and free opportunities for combined planning with agencies in other policy
domains. The status of an organization would enable execution of joint strategies, rather
than depending on others for implementation. In the medium term, even the relocation of
environmental policy tasks to a new world environment organization might be conceivable.
Many non-environmental bureaucracies have in recent decades created environmental
departments within their own premises. On the one hand, this can be described as
successful sectoral policy integration. On the other hand, it can also lead to less
far-reaching environmental policies if the environmental departments in these non-
environmental bureaucracies perform less than could be expected from a fully fledged
environmental organization. The environment division of the secretariat of the Interna-
tional Maritime Organization, for example, has been shown as being strongly influenced by
the overall technocratic approach of this organization that favors the interests of unhin-
dered maritime transport and the shipping industry (Campe 2009). Equally, the environ-
mental activities of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization might be overly influenced
by the production-oriented mission of this large bureaucracy. While it seems unlikely that a
new UN environment agency would easily be transferred core functions and bureaucratic
units of non-environmental organizations, a ‘‘slippery slope’’ in this direction might well
be created over time.
14 Esty (1996, 111) for instance has suggested that UN specialized agencies such as the World Meteoro-
logical Organization may be merged into a new global environmental agency.
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4.4 Hierarchization through creation of a new agency
The fourth and most far-reaching option is that of a hierarchical intergovernmental
organization on environmental issues that would be equipped with majority decision
making as well as with enforcement powers—such as trade sanctions—vis-a`-vis states that
fail to comply with international agreements. Proposals in this direction are usually the
domain of environmental activists who lament the relatively slow pace of environmental
negotiations and treaty implementation. Yet also some governments and intergovernmental
processes have at times shown a certain openness for majority decision-making and
stronger enforcement powers. For example, the Hague Declaration of 1989 seemed to have
veered in the direction of an environmental agency with sanctioning powers, and at the end
of the 1980s, New Zealand had suggested establishing an ‘‘environment protection
council’’, whose decisions would be binding.15 Yet support for hierarchical models remains
scarce. The only example for a quasi-supranational body at the global level is the UN
Security Council, which enjoys far-reaching powers under Chap. VII of the UN Charter.
However, while the prospective benefits of an ‘‘environmental security council’’ remain a
part of the overall discourse, such an organization does not appear to be a realistic option in
the next decades—and it is open to doubt whether it would be desirable at all.
The creation of such an organization would involve major organizational change as
existing organizations and their bureaucracies would be incorporated and loose their inde-
pendence. It would also demand the most far-reaching institutional change, as the formation
would require major alterations in the current institutional system. Naturally, the establish-
ment of a hierarchical intergovernmental organization for the environment will improve
environmental policy integration. Yet such proposals are largely unrealistic, might come with
major problems in other areas—especially when it comes to North-South relations—and are
for these reasons decreasing in relevance in both the academic and policy communities.
5 Conclusion
The debate on how to improve global environmental governance has proceeded in surges
and continues to do so, as new initiatives unfold and older ideas resurface. Currently,
reforming the UN system is mentioned as a top priority for UN Secretary General Ban
Ki-Moon (as it has been for his predecessors).16 Recent UN proposals to strengthen the
environmental dimension of sustainable development include the recommendations of
the High-Level Panel on System Wide Coherence in their report Delivering as One and the
Inter-Linkages Initiative by the UN University, which advocates better harmonization and
coordination between multilateral environmental agreements. These proposals remain
close to the current system and offer potential for reform in the short term. Also, clustering
holds some promise for improvements. However, although parts of the literature present
clustering of institutions and bureaucracies as an option that renders a new world envi-
ronment organization redundant, clustering is more likely to be part of a larger solution
toward more effective global environmental governance and can be best understood as a
transitionary tool for pursuing this reform in a bottom-up process.
15 United Nations General Assembly, General Debate Settlement at the 44th Session, October 2, 1989,
Statement of the Right Honourable Geoffrey Palmer, Prime Minister of New Zealand. See also Palmer
(1992, at 278ff).
16 See: Secretary-General’s press conference, New York, September 18, 2007, available online at
http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=2739.
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In the longer term, upgrading UNEP and (later) streamlining it with other institutions
and bureaucracies appears as a both necessary and feasible option for reforming global
environmental governance, while at the same time offering potential for increasing envi-
ronmental policy integration at the global level (see Table 3 for a summary of our argu-
ment). The highest promise of both upgrading and streamlining lies in increased internal
environmental policy integration within the environmental realm. Integration beyond the
environmental sphere, most significantly by integrating environment and development, is
likely to be improved too, yet probably to a lesser degree.
Pursuing the upgrading and streamlining approach will bring organizational and insti-
tutional change to the current system, and realization of either option thus requires sub-
stantial support from all major governments. It is thus unlikely that either of these options
could be realized in the short term.
Table 3 Summary of key findings
Clustering UNEP upgrade to
UNEO
Streamlining Hierarchization
Will reform proposal
improve the
integration of different
intergovernmental
environmental
institutions?
Yes, yet
not
formally
Yes, yet not formally,
but with stronger
coordinating
bureaucracy at the
center
Yes, through
institutional
integration in
larger organization
Yes, through
institutional
integration in
larger organization
with enforcement
mechanism
Will reform proposal
improve the cognitive,
normative, and
executive influence of
the UN system by
better integrating
existing actors with
an environmental
mandate?
No No with regard to
integration; but a
stronger
bureaucracy at the
center will have
more cognitive,
normative, and
executive influence
in global
environmental
governance
Yes, mainly through
integration of
environmental
treaty secretariats
(and possibly also
parts of other
organizations)
Yes, mainly through
integration of
environmental
treaty secretariats
(and possibly also
parts of other
organizations)
Will reform proposal
improve the
integration of
intergovernmental
environmental
institutions with non-
environmental
institutions?
Probably
not
Yes, yet not formally,
but a stronger
environmental
bureaucracy
improves
coordinating and
policy-development
role vis-a`-vis non-
environmental
institutions
Probably not more
than in the case of
upgrading
Probably not more
than in the case of
upgrading
Will reform proposal
improve the cognitive,
normative, and
executive influence of
the UN system by
better integrating
environmental actors
and non-environmental
actors?
Probably
not
Yes, yet not formally,
but a stronger
environmental
bureaucracy
improves
coordinating and
policy-development
role vis-a`-vis non-
environmental
organizations and
their bureaucracies
Yes, if functions
from non-
environmental
organizations are
being transferred to
the new
environmental
agency
Yes, if functions
from non-
environmental
organizations are
being transferred to
the new
environmental
agency
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Essential to the success of any new organization is the support from developing
countries. This is substantiated by the most recent phase in the debate on improving global
environmental governance. Brazil has instigated a new round of discussion, by giving the
proposal for a combined organization for environment and development new impetus. It
has recently started a new endeavor from within diplomatic circuits, to gather support for
such an organization. An organization combining environment and development is likely
to receive more support from developing countries, as developing countries often fear a
strong environmental organization would be detrimental to developmental issues. Incor-
porating these issues within a strong combined organization would prevent development
from a decline in consideration. However, merging environmental policies with develop-
ment policies in one institutional and organizational setting brings with it also certain
dangers, including the possibility that environmental concerns—which are of core interest
today also in the developing world—are effectively marginalized in the process (Biermann
2005, 132–135).
An alternative option—and probably the preferable one—would be to establish a strong
environmental organization while altering UNDP’s status simultaneously. This way, both
environment and development would have a strong voice, without compromising one or
the other. Developing countries might be easier inclined to support a new environmental
organization, when it involves improved status for UNDP as well.
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